Clause index¶
Every paragraph of the MAS Guidelines on Artificial Intelligence Risk Management (7 October 2026) and what in this toolkit implements it. Generated from src/airm/catalog/mas_airm_2026.yaml and src/airm/controls/controls.yaml; do not edit by hand.
Summaries are the toolkit authors' paraphrase, never the regulatory text. Read the cited paragraph in the primary document before relying on it.
| Clause | Kind | Due | Summary | Controls | Module |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| §1.1 | context | 2027-10-07 | States the purpose: MAS supervisory expectations on AI risk management covering oversight, key systems/policies/procedures, lifecycle controls and capability/capacity, to support responsible AI adoption by financial institutions. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.2 | scope | 2027-10-07 | Guidelines complement existing MAS legislation and guidelines (FEAT still applies; read with other guidelines, circulars and industry standards). They apply on a group basis for locally incorporated FIs under consolidated supervision or owning critical information infrastructure. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.3 | definition | 2027-10-07 | Defines AI as machine-based systems or models deriving outputs through learned premises from data or inputs; outputs include estimates, predictions, content, summaries, recommendations, decisions. Rule-based calculators and fixed-logic tools are excluded. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.4 | definition | 2027-10-07 | Defines model (method converting assumptions and inputs to outputs), system (one or more models plus other machine-based components) and use case (the real-world context a model or system is applied to). | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.5 | scope | 2027-10-07 | High-level expectations apply to all FIs deploying AI, including Generative AI and AI agents. An FI in a global group may rely on group AI risk frameworks if they meet these expectations. | AIRM-3.6-LOCAL-ACCOUNTABILITY |
airm.catalog |
| §1.6 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Implement the Guidelines proportionately to the FI's size, nature of activities and the extent to which its AI use could create material risks. | AIRM-3.2-RISK-FRAMEWORK-COVERAGE |
airm.catalog |
| §1.7 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Regularly review the adequacy of AI risk management against AI developments and address new or accentuated risks. | AIRM-1.7-PERIODIC-FRAMEWORK-REVIEW |
airm.catalog |
| §1.8 | scope | 2027-10-07 | Effective 7 October 2027. Sections 3-4 expectations from 7 October 2027; Sections 5-6 by 7 October 2028. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.9 | context | 2027-10-07 | AI's complexity and probabilistic nature increase uncertainty and hidden bias. Risks extend existing categories: financial, operational, conduct, financial crime and reputational. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.10 | context | 2027-10-07 | Generative AI amplifies AI risks and is harder to evaluate, test and explain. Additional risks: security (prompt injection, poisoning), privacy, legal/IP, third-party concentration, operational outages, human factors including shadow AI and automation bias. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.11 | context | 2027-10-07 | AI agents with autonomy and tool access can execute unauthorised or erroneous actions misaligned with goals; compromised agents may exfiltrate data or run malicious commands at scale. | — | airm.catalog |
| §1.12 | context | 2027-10-07 | MAS will update or augment the Guidelines as AI and its risks evolve. | — | airm.catalog |
| §2.1 | scope | 2027-10-07 | Guidelines apply to all FIs proportionately to size and risk profile. | — | airm.controls |
| §2.2 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Unless 2.3 applies, an FI must establish oversight frameworks with AI identification, materiality assessment and inventory (Sections 3-4) and apply lifecycle controls and capabilities (Sections 5-6), calibrated by relevance and risk materiality. | — | airm.controls |
| §2.3 | scope | 2027-10-07 | An FI may apply only basic governance (2.5) if poor performance or unavailability of its AI tools is unlikely to materially harm the FI, customers or stakeholders, considering financial/operational/regulatory/legal/reputational impact and fairness, ethics, consumer protection. | AIRM-2.5-BASIC-POLICIES |
airm.controls |
| §2.4 | guidance | 2027-10-07 | Examples that generally meet the 2.3 basic-regime test: AI assisting with drafting emails, summarising documents, initial document review, generating formulas or charts, image generation for materials, and internal resource-finding chatbots, with human review. | AIRM-2.5-BASIC-POLICIES |
airm.controls |
| §2.5 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Basic AI governance must minimally include accountable senior management, permitted and prohibited uses with human oversight rules, an approved-tool list and approval process, staff education, compliance checks, and periodic/trigger-based review of the 2.3 criteria. | AIRM-2.5-BASIC-POLICIES |
airm.controls |
| §3.1 | context | 2027-10-07 | Board and senior management are central to establishing and overseeing AI risk frameworks. | — | airm.controls |
| §3.2 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Ensure existing risk frameworks identify, assess and address AI risks; maintain oversight, foster risk culture, and ensure AI use does not conflict with regulatory requirements or supervisory expectations. | AIRM-3.2-RISK-FRAMEWORK-COVERAGE |
airm.controls |
| §3.3 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Ensure consistent standards, clear accountability and coordination across the FI; a centralised AI risk function or existing functions are both acceptable if management is consistent and coordinated. | AIRM-3.3-COORDINATED-OVERSIGHT |
airm.controls |
| §3.4 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Board (or delegated committee) approves and reviews the AI governance approach and strategic direction, embeds AI risks in the risk appetite framework, sets roles, maintains adequate AI understanding, and reviews these regularly. | AIRM-4.11-RISK-APPETITE, AIRM-5.11-CONCENTRATION, AIRM-3.3-COORDINATED-OVERSIGHT, AIRM-3.6-LOCAL-ACCOUNTABILITY |
airm.controls |
| §3.5 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Senior management implements and reviews AI risk frameworks, institutes lifecycle controls, sets roles including control functions for identification/inventory/materiality, runs escalation for incidents and breaches, updates the board, and resources competence. | AIRM-5.23-INCIDENT-MANAGEMENT, AIRM-3.3-COORDINATED-OVERSIGHT |
airm.controls |
| §3.6 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Local senior management remains accountable that group frameworks address Singapore-specific requirements, has visibility and input, has escalation paths for local issues, and can demonstrate oversight to MAS. | AIRM-3.6-LOCAL-ACCOUNTABILITY |
airm.controls |
| §4.1 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | The AI risk framework must include systems, policies and procedures for identification, inventorisation and risk materiality assessment, applied consistently, with controls proportionate to assessed materiality. | AIRM-4.1-FRAMEWORK-PROCESSES |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.2 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Establish systems, policies and procedures for consistent AI identification across all business and functional areas, with clear definitions, criteria and processes supported by tools; minimally cover AI embedded in services from material third-party providers. | AIRM-4.3-IDENTIFICATION-PROCESS, AIRM-4.2-FN21-EMBEDDED-AI |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.3 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Assign roles for AI identification and designate a control function with independent oversight; it is the final arbiter of what is AI, keeps documentation, and reviews the process for new technologies and third-party AI introductions. | AIRM-4.3-IDENTIFICATION-PROCESS, AIRM-4.1-FRAMEWORK-PROCESSES |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.4 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Keep residual risk from unidentified AI (embedded AI, shadow AI) within risk appetite: identify the risks from identification constraints and put mitigating measures in place. | AIRM-4.4-FN22-SHADOW-AI |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.5 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Establish and maintain an accurate inventory of AI use cases, systems or models to the extent practicable, with policies on maintenance and an appropriate update frequency reflecting new, updated or decommissioned AI. | AIRM-4.5-INVENTORY-MAINTAINED |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.6 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Enhance existing inventories or build a dedicated AI inventory; either way maintain clear linkages to other inventories (data, third-party) for cross-referencing. | AIRM-4.6-FN23-REGISTER-LINKAGE, AIRM-4.6-FN23-LINKAGES-DECLARED |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.7 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Inventory captures key attributes at appropriate granularity: purpose and description, approved scope, model type, data used, dependencies, lifecycle status, materiality rating, review status, roles (owners, developers), links to documentation. | AIRM-4.7-INVENTORY-ATTRIBUTES, AIRM-5.1-LIFECYCLE-ROLES |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.8 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Regularly review inventory design so attributes cover newer AI technologies (e.g. agent attributes, guardrails) and third-party AI information. | AIRM-4.8-FN25-AGENT-ATTRIBUTES, AIRM-5.16-AGENT-PERMISSIONS, AIRM-1.7-PERIODIC-FRAMEWORK-REVIEW |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.9 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Assign roles for inventorisation and designate a control function to own inventory policies; business units may maintain entries but the control function retains independent oversight of accuracy and completeness. | AIRM-4.5-INVENTORY-MAINTAINED, AIRM-4.1-FRAMEWORK-PROCESSES |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.10 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Establish a materiality assessment methodology anchored on the AI use case, applied consistently to every use case, so that controls scale with risk and higher-materiality use cases receive more scrutiny. | AIRM-4.11-MATERIALITY-ASSESSED |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.11 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Assess both inherent (pre-control) and residual (post-control) materiality; residual materiality must meet risk appetite before deployment; review methodology and assessments regularly. | AIRM-4.11-MATERIALITY-ASSESSED, AIRM-4.11-RISK-APPETITE |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.12 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Materiality must minimally cover Impact (consequences of failure on FI and customers, data sensitivity), Complexity (technology, novelty, data, explainability, third-party visibility) and Reliance (dependence, autonomy, human involvement). | AIRM-4.11-MATERIALITY-ASSESSED |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §4.13 | expectation | 2027-10-07 | Designate a control function to own the materiality framework and arbitrate or approve ratings, with independent oversight, clear documentation and regular review of assessments. | AIRM-4.13-MATERIALITY-ARBITRATED, AIRM-4.1-FRAMEWORK-PROCESSES |
airm.inventory, airm.materiality, airm.scan |
| §5.1 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Plan and implement controls across the entire lifecycle of each use case, system or model; assign roles across units; review controls regularly for newer AI technologies. | AIRM-5.1-LIFECYCLE-ROLES, AIRM-1.7-PERIODIC-FRAMEWORK-REVIEW |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.2 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Apply lifecycle controls proportionately to materiality; where constraints exist (e.g. limited third-party disclosure) identify the risks, mitigate (e.g. limit use) and keep residual risk within appetite. | AIRM-5.2-FN28-PILOT-GUARDRAILS, AIRM-5.11-LIMIT-SUSPEND-REPLACE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.3 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | High-risk use cases need tested contingency plans with fallback options (alternative systems, manual processes), reviewed regularly; kill-switch activation protocols must exist and be tested. | AIRM-5.3-CONTINGENCY-PLAN, AIRM-5.3-KILL-SWITCH |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.4 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Data across the lifecycle must be fit for purpose, representative, high quality and governed; cover fitness, representativeness, quality, classification, security, privacy, and auditability/lineage. | AIRM-5.4-DATA-GOVERNANCE, AIRM-5.4-DATA-CLASSIFICATION, AIRM-5.4-DATA-SECURITY, AIRM-5.4-DATA-PRIVACY, AIRM-5.4-DATA-LINEAGE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.5 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Establish controls for an appropriate level of transparency and explainability so customers, users and stakeholders can assess risks, reliability and limitations, and the FI can show AI use aligns with stated objectives. | AIRM-5.5-TRANSPARENCY-CONTROLS |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.6 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Degree scales with context and materiality; high-impact uses (credit, underwriting, advisory, fund management) need input-feature justification, key-driver identification, customer notification, consequences and redress channels, tailored to the audience. | AIRM-5.5-TRANSPARENCY-CONTROLS, AIRM-5.6-CUSTOMER-DISCLOSURE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.7 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Define "fair" outcomes and control for harmful bias and discrimination across the lifecycle, calibrated to context and materiality; credit and underwriting warrant greater attention. | AIRM-5.8-FAIRNESS-ASSESSMENT |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.8 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Where fairness is relevant, conduct fairness assessments: define protected attributes (and proxies), test for systematic disadvantage with fairness metrics, document results and mitigations. | AIRM-5.8-FAIRNESS-ASSESSMENT |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.9 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Put in place and review human oversight proportionate to materiality, mindful of automation bias and decision fatigue; cover roles, capabilities and authority to intervene, design for oversight with escalation triggers, and documentation/review of interventions. | AIRM-5.9-HUMAN-OVERSIGHT, AIRM-5.9-DESIGN-FOR-OVERSIGHT, AIRM-5.9-OVERSIGHT-EFFECTIVENESS |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.10 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Onboarding, development and deployment controls for third-party AI must fit materiality; contracts must give visibility of AI introduction and changes; test in the FI's context with its own data, do compensatory testing, and document suitability. | AIRM-5.10-THIRD-PARTY-TESTING |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.11 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | FI retains accountability for third-party AI; assess transparency, supply chain, concentration, change notification, contingency, legal terms, capabilities and complexity; if residual risk exceeds appetite, limit, suspend or replace the provider. | AIRM-5.11-THIRD-PARTY-TRANSPARENCY, AIRM-5.11-CHANGE-NOTIFICATION, AIRM-5.11-CONCENTRATION, AIRM-5.11-SUPPLY-CHAIN, AIRM-5.11-LIMIT-SUSPEND-REPLACE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.12 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | When selecting systems, models or features consider objectives and risks; document the rationale proportionately to materiality, especially for complex choices; weigh performance against complexity, fairness, explainability; involve domain experts. | AIRM-5.12-SELECTION-RATIONALE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.13 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | For newer, less-understood systems or models, weigh benefits against heightened risks such as hallucination, opaqueness and security, and the FI's capability to mitigate them. | AIRM-5.12-SELECTION-RATIONALE |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.14 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Evaluate and test each system or model to an appropriate reliability and safety level before deployment; set measurable thresholds agreed by business, developers and reviewers; use representative datasets, diverse testing approaches, and overfitting mitigation. | AIRM-5.14-EVALUATION-MEASURES, AIRM-5.14-TESTING-APPROACHES |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.15 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Mitigate identified risks and limitations with controls and guardrails before deployment; testing of Generative AI and agents must cover key failure modes and the effectiveness of guardrails. | AIRM-5.2-FN28-PILOT-GUARDRAILS, AIRM-5.15-GUARDRAIL-EFFECTIVENESS, AIRM-5.15-GENAI-FAILURE-MODES |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.16 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Secure, well-governed AI systems with controls proportionate to materiality: hardened secure environments, input validation, API authentication, encryption, DLP; RBAC, MFA, privileged access, separation of duties; governance of third-party plugins and APIs. | AIRM-5.16-SECURITY-CONTROLS, AIRM-5.16-ACCESS-CONTROL, AIRM-5.16-AGENT-PERMISSIONS, AIRM-5.16-THIRD-PARTY-COMPONENTS |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.17 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Document the development process so an independent party can understand and potentially replicate the implementation and its evaluation; rigour scales with materiality; cover data, selection, training, evaluation, explainability/fairness, assumptions and limitations. | AIRM-5.4-DATA-LINEAGE, AIRM-5.17-DEVELOPMENT-DOCUMENTATION |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.18 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Before deployment, parties not involved in development review that controls were followed and assess suitability, robustness and performance within defined boundaries; scope and independence proportionate to materiality. | AIRM-5.18-PRE-DEPLOYMENT-REVIEW |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.19 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | High-materiality use cases need formal independent validation by competent, objective personnel independent of development and deployment, covering conceptual soundness, data, implementation integrity, evaluation results, explainability/fairness, assumptions. | AIRM-5.19-INDEPENDENT-VALIDATION |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.20 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Non-high-materiality use cases may use other documented reviews, such as peer review by qualified individuals not involved in development or deployment. | AIRM-5.18-PRE-DEPLOYMENT-REVIEW |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.21 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Reviewers report findings, limitations, remediation and conditions of use to the approval body, which ensures recommendations are actioned. | AIRM-5.21-FINDINGS-ACTIONED |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.22 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Technology and cybersecurity reviews before production: secure design, least privilege, deployment checklists confirming encryption, DLP, firewalls, access, logging; vulnerability assessment, penetration testing, red teaming and adversarial testing with safeguards. | AIRM-5.22-SECURITY-REVIEW |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.23 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Ongoing monitoring of all deployed AI proportionate to materiality: metrics and tiered thresholds, drift checks, agent reasoning/action/tool monitoring, incident management with kill switches for high risk, accountable roles, records and access logging, training. | AIRM-5.3-KILL-SWITCH, AIRM-5.23-MONITORING-MEASURES, AIRM-5.23-AGENT-TRACE-MONITORING, AIRM-5.23-GENAI-LOGGING, AIRM-5.23-INCIDENT-MANAGEMENT, AIRM-5.23-ACCOUNTABLE-PERSON, AIRM-5.23-TRAINING-AWARENESS |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.24 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Re-validate or review AI as needed, with frequency and rigour informed by materiality; high-materiality use cases get regular independent re-validation; triggers include interconnected findings, monitoring breaches, significant changes, new external risks. | AIRM-5.24-REVALIDATION |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.25 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Comprehensive change controls: a framework to grade change significance with review and re-approval for significant changes (compensating monitoring where prior review is impossible); change control with version tracking and rollback; enhanced controls for automatic updates. | AIRM-5.11-CHANGE-NOTIFICATION, AIRM-5.25-CHANGE-FRAMEWORK, AIRM-5.25-CHANGE-CONTROL, AIRM-5.25-DYNAMIC-UPDATES |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §5.26 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Controls for retirement or decommissioning when AI is no longer needed or exceeds risk tolerance: dependencies, data retention, secure removal from production, stakeholder notification. | AIRM-5.26-RETIREMENT |
airm.controls, airm.evals, airm.monitor, airm.thirdparty |
| §6.1 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Ensure competence and proper conduct of personnel developing, deploying and using AI: recruit talent, train, build culture; allocate human, technological and financial resources proportionate to risk. | AIRM-5.23-TRAINING-AWARENESS, AIRM-6.1-COMPETENCE |
airm.controls |
| §6.2 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Regularly review that personnel have adequate capability and capacity, and that training programmes stay current for newer AI technologies. | AIRM-5.23-TRAINING-AWARENESS, AIRM-6.1-COMPETENCE |
airm.controls |
| §6.3 | expectation | 2028-10-07 | Technology infrastructure (compute, network, memory, secure data pipelines) must meet performance, scalability and resilience needs, considering technology risk management guidelines and industry frameworks. | AIRM-6.3-INFRASTRUCTURE |
airm.controls |
Footnotes that carry requirements¶
Several footnotes carry expectations rather than references, and the toolkit treats them as binding.
| Footnote | Anchored to | Kind | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| fn1 | §1.1 | definition | FI as defined in Section 2 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2022. |
| fn4 | §1.2 | scope | Consolidated supervision covers locally incorporated banking and insurance FIs. |
| fn5 | §1.2 | definition | Critical information infrastructure as defined in the Cybersecurity Act 2018. |
| fn6 | §1.3 | scope | In-scope examples: machine learning, deep learning, NLP, computer vision, generative AI/LLMs, AI agents and multi-agent systems. Out of scope: rule-based systems, manually specified formulae, fixed RPA. |
| fn7 | §1.4 | definition | Use case / system / model are used explicitly where a point is specific to one. |
| fn10 | §1.10 | definition | Third-party AI: AI systems or models, and services or tools incorporating AI, developed, owned, operated or provided externally that an FI procures, subscribes to, accesses or relies on. |
| fn13 | §2.4 | expectation | Humans in the 2.4 example use cases should review and check outputs before use. |
| fn20 | §3.5 | definition | AI incident means an incident involving failure, malfunction or poor performance of the underlying AI system(s) or model(s). |
| fn21 | §4.2 | scope | Embedded AI example: SaaS not sold as AI but containing AI features the FI uses. |
| fn22 | §4.4 | guidance | Shadow-AI mitigations: staff guidance on allowed/disallowed uses including embedded features and public tools, and technical controls such as network monitoring and data loss prevention to detect unauthorised AI use. |
| fn23 | §4.6 | guidance | Linkages via consistent data asset identifiers to data inventories and vendor/service identifiers to third-party registers. |
| fn24 | §4.7 | expectation | Differences in attributes captured across use cases must be delineated in policy; omissions must not compromise oversight. |
| fn25 | §4.8 | guidance | Agent inventory attributes: agent-specific identifiers, tools and systems the agent can access, its components, and the guardrails imposed. |
| fn26 | §4.10 | expectation | Dependencies between AI systems or models supporting a use case should be considered where they affect its risk profile. |
| fn27 | §5.1 | definition | AI life cycle spans inception to retirement (adapted from ISO/IEC 22989). |
| fn28 | §5.2 | expectation | Partial deployments (pilots, phased rollouts) need policies governing deviations from standard controls: time and user limits, success criteria, terms of use, close monitoring, scope compliance. |
| fn29 | §5.3 | definition | Kill switches are mechanisms to deactivate AI expeditiously if it exceeds risk tolerances. |
| fn32 | §5.5 | definition | Transparency is disclosure to affected individuals plus explanations on request; explainability is methods (built-in or post-hoc) for understanding outputs. |
| fn34 | §5.6 | guidance | Customer disclosures need not be technical (effects, basis for decisions, redress); technical detail suits internal evaluators; IMDA chatbot transparency guidelines referenced. |
| fn36 | §5.8 | expectation | Proxies for, or attributes highly correlated with, protected attributes must also be considered. |
| fn37 | §5.9 | scope | Human oversight expectations cover every case where the FI judged human involvement necessary, whether in-the-loop or over-the-loop. |
| fn38 | §5.10 | scope | Development controls apply where the FI modifies or fine-tunes third-party AI before deployment. |
| fn39 | §5.10 | scope | MAS outsourcing and third-party service expectations apply to third-party AI. |
| fn41 | §5.12 | definition | Models include specific ML/DL models or techniques such as optimisation or fine-tuning. |
| fn42 | §5.12 | definition | Features are dataset attributes; feature engineering creates or transforms them. |
| fn45 | §5.15 | guidance | Pilots or phased rollouts with guardrails can be used to obtain representative data when testing data is limited. |
| fn46 | §5.15 | expectation | GenAI testing must pay particular attention to hallucination, toxic/harmful/biased content, bias, data leakage or disclosure, and vulnerability to adversarial attack. |
| fn48 | §5.20 | scope | Reviewers must be independent of both initial and ongoing deployment (operation) of the AI. |
| fn49 | §5.25 | guidance | Change examples: training data, model/system architecture, key assumptions, scope of use, downstream impact. |
Expectations with no implementing control¶
- §2.2 (Application of the Guidelines) — Unless 2.3 applies, an FI must establish oversight frameworks with AI identification, materiality assessment and inventory (Sections 3-4) and apply lifecycle controls and capabilities (Sections 5-6), calibrated by relevance and risk materiality.